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Abstract
What determines the willingness of renewable energy cooperatives (RECs) to strengthen their involvement in politics at
the different levels of governments (local/regional, national, transnational)? We address this research question by using
data from an original survey distributed to RECs in Germany. The descriptive analysis shows that the RECs are less willing
to participate in energy governance at the EU/transnational level than at the national and especially the subnational level.
Our analytical findings, first, show that the odds of RECs to participate in governance processes in the future are greater for
those RECs that are already involved in such processes. Put differently, we find that engagement in energy governance is
affected by path-dependence. Second, participation in subnational governance processes is determined by dissatisfaction
with policy decisions taken at that level: the more dissatisfied the respondents, the more likely they are to exert influ-
ence in the future. For the Energy Union to realise its aim of incorporating a broader range of stakeholders, the European
Commission must highlight the opportunity structure it provides for participating in governance processes.
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1. Introduction
In 2015, the European Commission published its Commu-
nication on the Energy Union, which calls for a transfor-
mation of Europe’s energy governance system (European
Commission, 2015). In 2016, a package of accompany-
ing policy measures (“Winter Package”) was presented
(see Ringel & Knodt, 2018). The Energy Union represents
an ambitious project, which draws on the four pillars of
EU energy policy: the functioning of the energy market,
the security of supply, the promotion of energy efficiency
and renewable energy, and the interconnection of en-
ergy networks (see, e.g., Tosun, Biesenbender, & Schulze,
2015). In addition, the Communication calls for speak-
ing with one voice in international negotiations and as-
signs citizens an important role in the energy transition,
that is a long-term structural change in energy systems to
replace energy produced from non-renewable resources
by renewable ones (see, e.g., Aklin & Urpelainen, 2018;
Cherp, Jewell, & Goldthau, 2011; Fraune & Knodt, 2017,
2018; Unnerstall, 2017; Verbong & Loorbach, 2012). The
European Commission’s framework is remarkable, not
least for its attempt to further strengthen the role citi-
zens play in energy policy. The Communication that lays
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out the framework strategy states that the European
Commission’s vision of an Energy Union is one “with citi-
zens at its core, where citizens take ownership of the en-
ergy transition” (European Commission, 2015, p. 2).
There exist two basic ways of interpreting this role as-
signed to citizens in the context of the energy transition.
First, citizens can play an active role in energy transition
by joining local renewable energy projects, among which
renewable energy cooperatives (RECs) represent a par-
ticularly prominent form (Kalkbrenner & Roosen, 2016;
Moss, Becker, &Naumann, 2015; Yildiz et al., 2015). RECs
are based on business models where citizens jointly own
and participate in renewable energy projects. RECs are
characterised by open membership, democratic mem-
ber control, economic participation through direct own-
ership, independence, cooperation among other coop-
eratives, and concern for the community. Second, citi-
zens can play a more passive role by (not) accepting the
implementation of local-level renewable energy projects
such as the creation ofwind parks (Fraune&Knodt, 2017,
2018; Scherhaufer, Höltinger, Salak, Schauppenlehner, &
Schmidt, 2017).
In this study, we are interested in RECs as organisa-
tions that consist of citizens who join them voluntarily
(see, e.g., Radtke, 2014). The literature on the determi-
nants of citizens’ willingness to join a REC is insightful.
Kalkbrenner and Roosen (2016), for example, stress the
importance of social norms, trust, environmental concern
and community identity as important factors affecting
the citizens’ willingness to participate in RECs. We do not
aim to contribute to that perspective. Instead, and in line
with the aims and scope of this special issue, we consider
RECs as collective actors and investigate their willingness
to exert political influence. Put differently, we adopt a
governance-oriented approach to RECs and examine their
(potential) role in a broader institutional setting.
What determines the willingness of RECs to
strengthen their involvement in politics at the different
levels of governments (local/regional, national, transna-
tional)? This is the research question that guides our anal-
ysis. The answer to this question provides important in-
sights concerning the Energy Union’s goal to strengthen
the citizens’ ownership of the energy transition, since
citizen-based RECs play an important role in the energy
transition. The European Environment Agency (2017, p.
13), for example, recognises RECs as key actors in en-
ergy governance. In Germany, RECs account for about
55% of the community-based energy sector (Kahla, Hol-
stenkamp, Müller, & Degenhart, 2017, p. 16), which
makes them important actors in energy governance.
In this context, we examine Germany-based RECs’ will-
ingness to participate in energy governance at the lo-
cal/regional, national, and transnational levels. We use
data from a survey of the executive boards of RECs in Ger-
many, collected in 2016/2017, that produced complete
responses from 174 RECs.
The remainder of this study unfolds as follows. First,
we provide some background information on how the
EU’s energy governance has developed and to what ex-
tent citizens are now invited to participate in gover-
nance. Next, we turn to the European Federation of RECs
(REScoop.eu) to show that an interest group represent-
ing RECs and their members has already been set up.
We then develop a theoretical argument on the deter-
minants of the willingness of RECs to exert political in-
fluence. The theory section is followed by the empirical
analysis and a discussion of the findings. The final section
then provides some concluding remarks and suggestions
for future research.
Our empirical analysis reveals two important findings.
First, a powerful predictor for RECs to exert influence
in the future is their current involvement in governance
processes. Second, dissatisfaction with policy decisions
taken at the local level increases the odds of RECs to con-
sider involvement in subnational governance processes.
Concerning the other political levels, our analysis does
not find that the level of dissatisfaction matters.
2. What Role to Play for Renewable Energy
Cooperatives in the Energy Union?
In this study, we seek to offer an analysis of how RECs
participate in European energy governance. We define
energy governance as energy-related activities by state
actors that is complemented by a multilevel and a multi-
actor process (Bazilian, Nakhooda, & Van de Graaf, 2014,
p. 219). In the case at hand, the multilevel system con-
sists of state and non-state actors that are active at the
local/regional, national, and transnational/European lev-
els. The multi-actor component refers to the interac-
tion between different types of state actors (e.g., fed-
eral governments and regional governments) as well
as their interaction with non-state actors, such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) or citizen-based or-
ganisations such as RECs.
The point of departure for this analysis is the Energy
Union, which the European Commission launched in
February 2015 and which seeks to establish a new form
of energy governance in the EU. The idea of founding
an Energy Union was introduced by Donald Tusk when
he was still Prime Minister of Poland, which aligns with
the country’s continued concerns over disruptions in en-
ergy supply (seeMarcinkiewicz & Tosun, 2015). The Euro-
pean Commission’s (2015, p. 4) strategy for realising the
Energy Union builds on the following five dimensions:
• Energy security, solidarity and trust;
• A fully integrated European energy market;
• Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of
demand;
• Decarbonising the economy; and
• Research, innovation and competitiveness.
The mutual realisation of these five dimensions is ex-
pected to increase the EU’s energy security, its sustain-
able development and competitiveness. The Communi-
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cation is remarkable in the sense that it frequently men-
tions citizens; in fact, citizens are often highlighted as the
beneficiaries of the Energy Union. However, the Euro-
peanCommission (2015, p. 2) also stresses that it expects
citizens to “take ownership of the energy transition”. Con-
sequently, in its section on the governance of the En-
ergy Union, the communication stipulates the need to es-
tablish arrangements that facilitate “an energy dialogue
with stakeholders to inform policy-making and support
active engagement in managing the energy transition”
(European Commission, 2015, p. 18). In other words,
the Commission invites citizen-based organisations to be-
come involved in energy governance.
The Energy Union is a new umbrella that brings to-
gether the elements of EU energy policy into an inte-
grated approach, as well as a continuing process since,
when the concept was adopted, it was still an “empty
box” (Szulecki, Fischer, Gullberg, & Sartor, 2016). A step
towards the realisation of the Energy Union is the
“Clean and Secure Energy for All Europeans”-Package or
“Winter” Package published in November 2016, which
also contains a proposal for the “Regulation on Gov-
ernance of the Energy Union” (European Commission,
2016a, 2016b; for a discussion, see Ringel & Knodt, 2018;
Szulecki et al., 2016). Another important instrument is
the annual progress reports prepared by the European
Commission. In the most recent report, the European
Commission (2017, p. 1) stated, “[n]ow is the time tomo-
bilise all of society—citizens, cities, rural areas, compa-
nies, academia, social partners—to take full ownership
of the Energy Union, take it forward and engage in devel-
oping the solutions of the future”.
Despite mentioning the importance of citizen-based
organisations in realising the Energy Union’s goals, the
strategic documents produced by the European Commis-
sion to date abstain from specifyingwhat role citizens are
exactly expected to play in the emerging governance ar-
rangements. The lack of definitional clarity might prove
problematic, since individual citizens or citizen-based
organisations may not feel addressed if the Commis-
sion does not extend an invitation for their involvement
and engagement.
Additionally, participation of citizen-based organisa-
tions, such as RECs, in energy governance may be inhib-
ited by transaction costs (see Coase, 1988; Dahlmann,
1979; North, 1992; Williamson, 1981). Building on the
original notion of transaction costs as associatedwith the
work of Coase (1988), Tosun, De Francesco and Peters
(2018) argue that policies, despite representing one spe-
cific form of an institution, can fail to lower transaction
costs if they are ambiguous. Therefore, not only the exis-
tence, but also the design of institutionsmatters for stim-
ulating efficiency (see also Coase, 1988). Applying this ar-
gument to the case of the Energy Union, the Commission
is unlikely to attain its goal of increasing the involvement
of stakeholders in energy governance if it does not detail
how participation is to be facilitated. In other words, if
RECs must invest to learn about their opportunities for
participation, they may lack the capacity and/or willing-
ness to become involved once they have gathered all nec-
essary information. Thus, by defining the formats as pre-
cisely as possible, the Commission will be in a position to
reduce the transaction costs and better stimulate stake-
holder involvement in energy governance.
Szulecki et al. (2016) interpret the vagueness in the
conceptualisation of the Energy Union differently. To
these authors, the lacking details provide an opportunity
structure for the various actor groups to participate in the
process and to shape the institutional design in away that
reflects their own preferences. This perspective is equally
plausible; but when looking at the different stakeholder
groups, including RECs, theymay lack the capacity and/or
power to make such strategic use of the situation and to
push for the realisation of their respective preferences
concerning the institutional design of the Energy Union.
3. European Federation of Renewable Energy
Cooperatives
In this section, before turning to the presentation of
our theoretical argument, we discuss the most perti-
nent type of transnational networks active in the field
of EU energy governance. Set up in 2013, REScoop.eu is
the European Federation of RECs, which currently com-
prises about 1,500 RECs. The organisation offers a plat-
form to citizens who engage in energy cooperatives and
strives to aggregate and articulate their interests towards
EU policy-makers. REScoop.eu recognises full and associ-
ated members; both types of members are involved in
energy governance processes.
The federation is governed by a board of directors,
which is elected by the general assembly for a four-year
term, with the members being eligible for re-election.
The board takes decisions related to policy, strategy and
planning, as well as controls the budgets and super-
vises the coordinator. The general assembly comprises
all members, including both full members and associate
members. Full members have voting rights and are either
individual RECs or national or regional federations. As-
sociate members do not have voting rights and are non-
governmental organisations, associations, companies or
individual citizens.
The organisational purpose of the federation is
twofold: on the one hand, REScoop.eu provides guid-
ance on best practices and seeks to stimulate learning
processes among RECs; on the other, it formulates po-
sition documents with a view to impact policy-making.
REScoop.eu also participates in the EU-funded Hori-
zon 2020 project “Renewable Energy Cooperatives Mo-
bilizing European Citizens to Invest in Sustainable En-
ergy” (REScoop MECISE) as well as other Horizon 2020
projects (see Huybrechts, Creupelandt, & Vansintjan,
2018), which shows how strongly the organisation is
rooted in the EU.
Table 1 gives an overview of REScoop.eu members,
broken down into full and associate members. It is im-
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portant to remember that many individual energy coop-
eratives are members of REScoop.eu through their na-
tional federation, that is, they are represented indirectly.
Among the full members are national and regional feder-
ations of RECs and individual cooperatives. When exam-
ining the table, it becomes apparent that German RECs
are well represented in the network through the Ger-
man Cooperative and Raiffeisen Confederation (DGRV).
According to the most recent survey (see Fischer & Wet-
zel, 2018), the number of RECs in Germany equalled 928
in 2015, whereas the DGRV (2017) represented 862 RECs
by the end of 2017. Although both take into account
new foundations since 2006 please note that the fig-
ures from Fischer and Wetzel (2018) and DGRV (2017)
are not fully comparable due to different timescales and
different accounting methods. We cannot, for instance,
preclude that the DGRV (2017)—although only a negli-
gible share—takes non-REC cooperatives into account.
From correspondence with REScoop.eu (Creupelandt,
2018, personal communication), we conclude that all
RECs represented by the DGRV are also represented in
REScoop.eu. If we consider the number of RECs identi-
fied by Fischer and Wetzel (2018), we can still confirm
that more than 90% of the German energy cooperatives
are—at least indirectly—represented in this particular
network. Both are impressive numbers and suggest that
it is worth looking at RECs in Germany in detail (see also
Klagge & Meister, 2018).
Another country that is well represented in the net-
work is the United Kingdom, followed by energy coop-
eratives in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and
Switzerland. Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland,
and Portugal participate in the REScoop.eu by means of
individual energy cooperatives. Turning to the three as-
sociate members, these are the EMES research network
of university research centres and individual researchers
on social enterprise in Belgium, ALIenergy (an energy
agency) in the United Kingdom, and BBEn (a citizen en-
ergy alliance) in Germany.
In the following sections, we will concentrate on Ger-
man RECs for the following three reasons. First, RECs ex-
ist in large numbers in Germany (Kahla et al., 2017). Sec-
ond, RECs represent an “important building block in the
energy transition in Germany” (Yildiz et al., 2015, p. 59).
Third, as shown above, RECs in Germany are widely rep-
resented in transnational networks, which suggests that
we can drawparticularly valuable insights concerning the
RECs’ willingness to participate in EU energy governance.
4. Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
The research interest of this study concerns the condi-
tions under which RECs become willing to engage in en-
ergy governance at the subnational, national and EU lev-
els. We assume RECs—similar to other strategic actors—
to be sensitive to the expected costs and benefits of be-
coming involved in governance arrangements. In most
cases, RECs are managed by volunteers with limited
capacity (see e.g., Herbes, Brummer, Rognli, Blazejew-
ski, & Gericke, 2017; Müller et al., 2015; Radtke, 2014),
which make considerations of costs and benefits partic-
ularly pertinent for explaining the (intended) behaviour
of RECs. Consequently, RECs are likely to become in-
volved in governance arrangements if the expected ben-
efits exceed the expected costs. The benefits of partic-
ipating in energy governance for RECs primarily consist
of the possibility to influence policy decisions in such a
way that renewable energy projects can be implemented
more easily and undermore favourable conditions. Since
the Energy Union is currently under construction (see
Ringel & Knodt, 2018), we are interested in the determi-
nants of future involvement in energy governance rather
Table 1. Overview of REScoop.eu members, 2018.
Full members
Federations Individual Associate members












United Kingdom 198 3 1
Notes: Own elaboration based on https://www.rescoop.eu/members (last access 6 October 2018). *Note the particularity for Germany
that RECs are represented in REScoop.eu through their membership in the DGRV. According to the DGRV (2017), by the end of 2017,
there existed 862 RECs in Germany. To avoid confusion, in the table we only report the figures retrieved from the website of REScoop.eu.
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than current engagement. Further, our analysis exam-
ines the three levels at which RECs could become in-
volved, namely the subnational, national and EU levels.
The current level of engagement is, however, an im-
portant factor for explaining future activities—as studies
on organisational behaviour rooted in historical institu-
tionalism also argue (see Thelen, 1999).We expect those
RECs that are already active to be more likely to partici-
pate in governance arrangements in the future as well.
This expectation is informed by the variation in the trans-
action costs (Coase, 1988), which comprise costs related
to searching and processing information, bargaining, and
monitoring and enforcement (Dahlman, 1979, p. 148). By
reducing transaction costs, for example by creating ap-
propriate institutions (North, 1992), decision-making can
become more efficient (Williamson, 1981). The transac-
tion costs should be low for RECs that already partici-
pate in governance at a given political level, but higher
for RECs that do not participate in governance arrange-
ments at the same political level. In other words, invest-
ing once in gathering information about the existence
and functioning of governance arrangements generates
“increasing returns” (Pierson, 2000), which explains why
RECs that already participate in energy governance are
also more likely to participate in it in the future. This rea-
soning paves the way for our first hypotheses:
H1a: RECs that currently participate in governance
arrangements at the subnational level are more
likely to participate in such governance arrange-
ments in the future.
H1b: RECs that currently participate in governance
arrangements at the national level are more likely
to participate in such governance arrangements in
the future.
H1c: RECs that currently participate in governance
arrangements at the EU level aremore likely to par-
ticipate in such governance arrangements in the
future.
The first hypothesis focuses on the transaction costs as-
sociated with participating in governance arrangements
but does not take into account the fact that RECs can
choose between multiple venues for their engagement
in EU energy policy, that is, the subnational, national
and transnational/EU levels. To formulate hypotheses,
we can think of RECs as advocacy organisations that
strategically select one or more venues for participat-
ing in energy governance (see Holyoke, Brown, & Henig,
2012). The EU’s multilevel system offers multiple points
of access or opportunity structures (Princen& Keremans,
2008) to RECs that are willing to participate in energy
governance. Some RECs should have the capacity (i.e.,
funding and personnel; Eising, 2007) to be active at the
various levels of the EU political system (Eising, 2008),
whereas RECswith limited capacitymust choose inwhich
institutional level they want to participate in governance
activities, if any. While we need to take capacity into
account when fitting our estimation models, this vari-
able cannot explain which of the three levels available—
subnational, national, transnational/EU—will be chosen
by RECs.
A variable that has a greater potential for explaining
the selection of a political venue is satisfaction. Accord-
ing to Hadjar and Beck (2010), political interest and par-
ticipation is generated by dissatisfaction with policy de-
cisions. Following this reasoning, we expect that RECs—
which are generally limited in their resources—will select
the political level with which they are unsatisfied for par-
ticipating in governance processes. A similar argument is
put forward by Pleines (2010, p. 241), who explains that
civil society organisations from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope are heavily involved in governance processes at the
EU level since they are dissatisfiedwith EU policies. Draw-
ing from these considerations put forward in different lit-
eratures (interest group behaviour and political participa-
tion), we formulate the following hypotheses:
H2a: RECs that are dissatisfied with policy deci-
sions at the subnational level aremore likely to par-
ticipate in governance activities at that level in the
future.
H2b: RECs that are dissatisfied with policy deci-
sions at the national level are more likely to par-
ticipate in governance activities at that level in the
future.
H2c: RECs that are dissatisfied with policy deci-
sions at the EU level are more likely to participate
in governance activities at that level in the future.
5. Data and Methods
This analysis is based on an original dataset con-
structed by using data from an online survey adminis-
tered between November 2016 and March 2017. Draw-
ing from the website www.energiegenossenschaften-
gruenden.de,we identified a total number of 762 RECs to
form the population, which left us with a figure smaller
than the 928 RECs identified by Fischer and Wetzel
(2018). Of the 762 RECs, we could only find contact de-
tails in the form of email addresses for 616. In Novem-
ber 2016, we contacted the executive board members
of these RECs via email and invited them to participate
in the online survey. The RECs were contacted a second
time in December 2016 and a third time in January 2017
to remind them of the survey and to re-extend our in-
vitation. Of the 616 RECs to receive an email invitation,
174 management board representatives completed the
online survey for their REC, which corresponds to a re-
sponse rate of 28%. It is important to remember that
the data collected reflects the perspective of the REC
executive board members only and that asking the indi-
vidual members could have produced different answers
(Holstenkamp & Kahla, 2016). Since we are interested in
strategic decisionsmade by RECs, approaching the execu-
tive boardmembers appeared an adequate strategy. The
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responses were treated anonymously according to the
relevant German data protection laws.
Before fielding the online survey programmed in
Lime Survey, it was pretested in September and Octo-
ber 2016 with 10 students and three selected represen-
tatives of two local RECs for checking the comprehensive-
ness, meaningfulness and length of the questions. While
we did not receive any critical response regarding the
length of the questionnaire, we changed the wording of
some questions to make them more intuitive in light of
the feedback we received. For instance, while we are in-
terested in participation in governance processes, the
pretest of the survey questionnaire revealed that “exert-
ing influence” is the proxy for this construct, which is best
understood by the respondents.
In what follows, we analyse the following ques-
tions as outcome variables, which comprise the re-
sponse categories “yes”, “no”, “don’t know” as well as
“no response”:
• Is your cooperative intending to exert influence at
the community level in the future?
• Is your cooperative intending to exert influence at
the regional level in the future?
• Is your cooperative intending to exert influence at
the federal level in the future?
• Is your cooperative intending to exert influence at
the European level in the future?
• Is your cooperative intending to exert influence at
the transnational level in the future?
We deleted the latter two response categories (“don’t
know” and “no response”) to construct a binary out-
come variable that takes the value 1 if a level was men-
tioned and 0 if not mentioned. We combined the com-
munity level and the regional level to generate the out-
come variable Subnational Future (1 if either or both
were mentioned, 0 if not). The question on the federal
level is the second outcome variableNational Future. For
the third outcome variable, EU/transnational Future, we
combined the European and the transnational levels (1 if
either or both were mentioned, 0 if not).
Table 2 presents the response patterns we ob-
tained for the intention to participate at the various
levels—subnational, national, and EU/transnational—in
the future (outcome variables) and the current engage-
ment (one of the focal explanatory variables, which
is also binary). There are several observations in the
table worth noting. The first one refers to the low
share of respondents (12%), indicating that they cur-
rently exert influence at the EU/transnational level. Re-
calling Table 1 and the information provided in sec-
tion 3 (that German RECs are automatically members of
REScoop.eu), the response pattern suggests that most
RECs are not aware of their potential to exert influence at
the EU/transnational level. This mismatch between the
membership in REScoop.eu and the RECs awareness of it
can be explained by their indirect membership through
the DGRV. If they exert influence, with most RECs (72%)
it is at the subnational level, followed by the national
level with 27%. Note that the respondents could indi-
cate multiple political levels at which they exert influ-
Table 2. Overview of current and future influence by German RECs.




Subnational Current 48 126 N = 174, Mean = 0.724, Standard Deviation = 0 .448
27.59% 72.41%
Subnational Future 25 149 N = 174, Mean = 0.856, Standard Deviation = 0.352
14.37% 85.63%
National Current 119 44 N = 163, Mean = 0.270, Standard Deviation = 0.445
73.01% 26.99 %
National Future 67 73 N = 140, Mean = 0.521, Standard Deviation = 0.501
47.86% 52.14%
EU/transnational Current 153 21 N = 174, Mean = 0.121, Standard Deviation = 0.327
87.93% 12.07%
EU/transnational Future 134 40 N = 174, Mean = 0.230, Standard Deviation = 0.422
77.01% 22.99%
Current 47 127 N = 174, Mean = 0.723, Standard Deviation = 0.445
27.01% 72.99%
Future 24 150 N = 174, Mean = 0.862, Standard Deviation = 0.346
13.79% 86.21%
Note: The numbers reported refer to the 174 RECs that completed the survey; incomplete and partly completed surveys were
disregarded.
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Figure 1. Bar graph of the current and future influence of RECs.
ence. Regarding future influence, it is again the subna-
tional level where 86% of the RECs intend to become ac-
tive, followed by the national level (52%) and then the
EU/transnational level (23%). Figure 1 offers a visualisa-
tion of the numbers reported in table 2.
The second set of focal explanatory variables refers
to the degree of dissatisfaction with renewable energy
policy decisions at the subnational, national and EU lev-
els. The response categories range from 4 (= very unsat-
isfied) to 1 (= very satisfied). We treated “don’t know”-
replies as missing data.
In addition to the two sets of focal explanatory vari-
ables, current influence and dissatisfaction with policy
decisions taken at the various political levels, we include
a number of control variables. As discussed in the the-
ory section, the literature on interest group behaviour
suggests that capacity plays an important role (see, e.g.,
Eising, 2007). Therefore, the RECs’ willingness to partici-
pate in governance processes and exert influence should
depend on their Age (in years; reference year = 2017),
which is a rough indicator of how established and pro-
fessional they are. Membership Size, in eight categories,
1 (smaller than 50) to 8 (greater than 1000), is equally
important for assessing the capacity of RECs, since we
expect RECs with a greater membership size to benefit
from more personnel and to be in a better position to
seek influence in the future. Likewise, the RECs’ Invest-
ment volume (ranging from 1 = below 200.000 EUR to
4 = above 3 million EUR) is an indicator of their organisa-
tional capacity. Furthermore, we need to control for the
self-understanding of the individual RECs, in the sense of
whether they seek Political Engagement at all (1 = yes,
0= no) and whether influencing political decisions is the
most important goal (1 = yes, 0 = no) of the respective
REC. Thus the control variables relate to capacity and Po-
litical Ambition of the RECs, which aligns with the liter-
ature on interest group advocacy in multilevel systems
(Eising, 2008). Table 4 reports the summary statistics for
the individual explanatory variables, excluding the first
set of focal explanatory variables as they are already pre-
sented in Table 2. The wording of the questions used for
the operationalisation of all variables can be found in Ta-
ble A3 (Annex).
In the next section, we will estimate logistic regres-
sionmodels for the first two outcome variables. Sincewe
cannot estimate conventional logistic regression mod-
els for future engagement at the EU level due to the
markedly unequal distribution of the values, the chosen
method is penalised maximum likelihood estimations as
put forth by Firth (1993). Observing very few events of
interest is not a problem per se, and, in many cases,
estimating regular logistic regression models does not
produce biased results. With the data at hand, how-
ever, the problem of rare events is paired with a small
Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Subnational Dissatisfaction 171 2.611 .703 1 4
National Dissatisfaction 174 3.552 .650 1 4
EU Dissatisfaction 156 3.391 .658 1 4
Age 174 5.914 2.447 1 22
Membership 173 3.497 1.662 1 8
Investment 172 2.459 1.099 1 4
Political Engagement 174 .937 .244 0 1
Political Ambition 174 .086 .282 0 1
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number of observations. Since estimates based on un-
conditional maximum likelihood functions tend to be-
come inaccurate when confronted with a small number
of cases, we need to implement the correction offered
by Firth’s estimator.
6. Presentation and Discussion of the Results
We now turn to the empirical testing of the hypothe-
ses put forward in Section 4. Table 5 presents the find-
ings of the logistic regressions (estimated according to
Firth’s approach for the third outcome variable). The ta-
ble presents two models per outcome variable: one vari-
able with the focal explanatory variables only (Basic) and
a second one that includes the control variables (Full).
The models differentiate between the subnational (Sub),
national (Nat), and EU/transnational (EU) levels. For a
better interpretation of the estimation results, odds ra-
tios are reported. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that
the odds for a given outcome are higher, whereas odds
ratios smaller than 1 indicate that the odds are lower. As
we can infer from the table, the odds of RECs to exert
influence at the subnational level is 65 times higher for
RECs that already exert influence at that level. For the
national level, the odds are 37 and 50 times higher for
RECs to exert influence at that level. Likewise, current
exertion of influence at the EU level increases the odds
for future engagement at that level by 74 and 71 times.
Consequently, the empirical findings support hypothe-
ses H1a–H1c. Regardless of the respective political level,
the current engagement in governance arrangement is a
strong predictor of future engagement.
Turning to the second set of explanatory variables,
dissatisfaction with policy decisions taken at the subna-
tional level increases the odds of RECs to seek influence
in the future at the same political level, which supports
H2a. Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities for the
RECs to answer that they intend to exert influence at the
subnational level in the future and how the probability
changes with the degree of satisfaction with subnational
policy decisions. The estimates are based on the mod-
els Sub-Basic and Sub-Full in Table 5. While the proba-
bility that a REC will seek to exert influence at the subna-
tional level in the future begins with .62 (Sub-Basic) and
.70 (Sub-Full), respectively, it increases with growing dis-
satisfaction with the policy decisions taken at that level.
The probabilities vary for the first three values of dissat-
isfaction for the two model specifications, but converge
with values greater than 2. It should also be noted that,
for the values smaller than 2, the 95% confidence inter-
Table 5. Results of the logistic regression models for the three outcomes variables.
Sub-Basic Sub-Full Nat-Basic Nat-Full EU-Basic EU-Full
Subnational Current 64.74 64.43
(54.46)*** (59.92)***
National Current 36.98 49.76
(28.50)*** (41.80)***
EU/transnational Current 74.15 71.12
(64.79)*** (67.48)***
Subnational Dissatisfaction 3.72 3.49 1.14 1.46 1.46 1.62
(1.94)** (1.95)** (0.37) (0.54) (0.52) (0.65)
National Dissatisfaction 1.39 1.28 1.55 2.18 0.93 1.09
(0.84) (0.83) (0.68) (1.10) (0.46) (0.58)
EU Dissatisfaction 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.78 1.31 1.22
(0.47) (0.55) (0.35) (0.36) (0.63) (0.58)
Age 1.18 0.93 0.88
(0.20) (0.12) (0.12)
Membership 0.93 0.73 0.74
(0.25) (0.14)* (0.15)
Investment 0.85 2.30 1.50
(0.32) (0.74)*** (0.45)
Political Engagement 1.12 3.56 3.05
(1.10) (4.39) (4.52)
Political Ambition — 1.90 0.63
(1.94) (0.80)
Cases 154 140 123 121 154 151
AIC 76.97 82.01 129.94 129.09 109.59 103.62
Notes: The table reports odds ratios; the models for the EU are estimated with the Firth correction; in Model Sub-Full, the odds ratios
for political ambition are omitted from the estimation routine because of this variable’s dependence on other variables in the model.
Table A6 in the Annex contains a fourth model that uses the total share of positive replies by REC executive board members regardless
of the political level as an outcome variable. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2. Predicted probabilities for future engagement at the subnational level with 95% confidence intervals for the
models Sub-Basic and Sub-Full.
vals are also comparatively great, which can be explained
by the smaller number of observations for these cate-
gories. Alternative specifications of the estimation mod-
els reported in Tables A7 and A8 (Annex) confirm the im-
portance of dissatisfaction with the subnational level for
the RECs’ intentions of becoming active in governance
arrangements in the future. For the other political levels,
we do not find any empirical support in the models and
therefore must reject hypotheses H2b–H2c.1
With regard to the control variables, it is worth not-
ing that they do not produce significant odds ratios. Only
in Model Nat-Full is the odds ratio significant at the 10%-
level and smaller than 1, indicating that a greater mem-
bership size reduces the odds of exerting influence in the
future at the national level. When inspecting the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), we can also see that the con-
trol variables do not always improve the fit of themodels.
Since smaller AIC values indicate a better fit, we can note
that Model Sub-Basic performs better than Model Sub-
Full. For the second outcome variable, the improvement
in themodel fit isminimal, but for the third outcome vari-
able the control variables indeed improve the model fit.
To summarise, we can conclude that the empirical
findings support hypotheses H1a–1c and H2a. The em-
pirical findings corroborate the importance of the cur-
rent engagement in governance arrangements for future
engagement as well as the mobilisation power of dissat-
isfaction with policy decisions taken at the subnational
level for the odds of RECs to consider exerting influence
in the future. We consider both findings relevant for the
European Commission’s intention of increasing the par-
ticipation of stakeholders in energy governance in the
context of the Energy Union. First, we observe a path-
dependent process, which may lead to a selective partic-
ipation of (German) RECs in EU energy governance. Sec-
ond, it is dissatisfaction (at the subnational level) that
mobilises RECs rather than satisfaction, which also sug-
gests that (German) RECs will consider carefully whether
to become involved in energy governance (at the subna-
tional level).
7. Conclusions
With its commitment to form an Energy Union, the EU
offers an opportunity structure for stakeholder engage-
ment and a way to decentralise energy governance. The
descriptive part of this analysis has shown that an impor-
tant stakeholder group in Germany—RECs—is currently
only marginally involved in energy governance, mostly
at the subnational level. This suggests that the German
RECs’ willingness and/or capacity to become involved in
energy governance at the EU/transnational level is lim-
ited. This finding is plausible, considering thatmostmem-
bers of RECs are active on a voluntary basis and that be-
coming involved with energy governance, even at the lo-
cal level, entails considerable effort and can easily over-
whelm volunteers. Research has shown that the man-
agement duties of executive REC board members are
increasing, which limits their capacity for other activi-
ties (see e.g., Herbes et al., 2017; Müller et al., 2015;
1 Table A8 (Annex) reports models that contain even fewer variables to check the robustness of the findings for the focal explanatory variables. However,
the model fit of the reduced models reported in Table A8 is worse and suggests that relevant variables are missing.
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Radtke, 2014). From that perspective, it is hardly surpris-
ing that we could not observe a more marked commit-
ment to participate in energy governance arrangements.
However, we were able to observe that RECs are consid-
ering becoming (more) active in the future, which holds
true both for RECs that are currently exerting influence in
subnational governance arrangements and those that in-
dicated (great) dissatisfactionwith policy decisions taken
at that level.
What are the broader implications of this finding for
the European Commission’s plea to bring citizens and
stakeholders to the core of the Energy Union? Most im-
portantly, the findings suggest that the participation of
stakeholders in EU energy governance is being inhibited
by barriers, which need to be addressed by the gov-
ernance arrangements that are still being decided (see
Ringel& Knodt, 2018). Compared to citizen-based groups
such as RECs, business interests and energy suppliers are
likely to be in a better position to seize the new opportu-
nity structure that the European Commission offers with
the Energy Union. It is therefore important to point out
to organisations such as RECs that the Energy Union of-
fers them an opportunity structure for participating in
governance processes beyond the subnational and na-
tional levels.
On the other hand, it was encouraging to see that
some German RECs are interested in participating in EU
energy governance, even though the great majority of
respondents indicated that they prefer to strengthen
their activities and engagement at the (sub-)national
level. The participation of RECs in energy governance
can strengthen their role in attaining low-carbon en-
ergy transition (see Cherp, Vinichenko, Jewell, Suzuki, &
Antal, 2017).
Despite the insights offered by this study, we also
need to mention its limitations. First, our analysis con-
centrated on RECs in Germany only, which makes it dif-
ficult to draw conclusions for RECs based in other EU
member states. A specific feature of RECs in Germany
is that, for many years, RECs benefitted from compara-
tively generous feed-in tariffs and that their recent re-
duction resulted in significant frustration with policy-
making (see Böhringer, Cuntz, Harhoff, & Asane-Otoo,
2017). A second limitation concerns the small sample
size, which forced us to estimate models that contain rel-
atively few explanatory variables. Third, we have cross-
sectional data only and, considering the changes to re-
newable energy policy in Germany (most importantly,
the reduction of the feed-in tariffs), it would have been
useful to have had a dataset at our disposal that dated
back to a year before 2014when the previous regimewas
still in place.
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study
makes a first, and important, contribution towards bet-
ter understanding the Energy Union’s potential for reach-
ing out to a more diverse set of stakeholders and for de-
termining which governance arrangements it can realis-
tically stimulate.
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Annex
Table A3.Wording of the questions from the online survey (translated from German).
Variable Wording of question in online survey Coding
Outcome variables
Subnational Future Which political level is your cooperative Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
intending to influence in the future?
[community; regional]
National Future Which political level is your cooperative Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
intending to influence in the future?
[federal]
EU/transnational Future Which political level is your cooperative Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
intending to influence in the future?
[European; transnational]
Focal explanatory variables
Subnational Current Which political level is your cooperative Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
currently influencing?
[community; regional]
National Current Which political level is your cooperative Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
currently influencing?
[federal]
EU/transnational Current Which political level is your cooperative Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
currently influencing?
[European; transnational]
Subnational Dissatisfaction How satisfied are you with energy policy 4 (= very unsatisfied) to 1 (= very
on different political levels? satisfied); mean value of dissatisfaction
[community; regional] with the community and regional level
National Dissatisfaction How satisfied are you with energy 4 (= very unsatisfied) to
policy on different political levels? 1 (= very satisfied)
[federal]
EU Dissatisfaction How satisfied are you with energy policy 4 (= very unsatisfied) to
on different political levels? 1 (= very satisfied)
[EU]
Control variables
Age When was your cooperative founded? Reference year = 2017
Please state the year.
Membership How many members has your cooperative 8 categories; 1 = smaller than 50 to
currently? Please state the quantity. 8 = greater than 1000
Political engagement Does your cooperation follow political Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
decisions regarding energy policy?
Political ambition What of these before mentioned aims of Binary variable (yes = 1; no = 0)
your cooperative is the most important aim?
[Political]
Investment How much money has your cooperative 4 categories; 1 = below 200.000 EUR to
invested in energy transformation projects 4 = above 3 million EUR
so far? Please state the approximate volume
in EUR.
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Table A6. Results of the logistic regression models for the three outcomes variables and total level of future influence as a
fourth outcome variable.









Subnational 3.72 3.49 1.14 1.46 1.46 1.62 3.17 3.42
Dissatisfaction (1.94)** (1.95)** (0.37) (0.54) (0.52) (0.65) (1.60)** (1.90)**
National 1.39 1.28 1.55 2.18 0.93 1.09 1.70 1.20
Dissatisfaction (0.84) (0.83) (0.68) (1.10) (0.46) (0.58) (1.05) (0.79)
EU 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.78 1.31 1.22 0.64 0.88
Dissatisfaction (0.47) (0.55) (0.35) (0.36) (0.63) (0.58) (0.41) (0.58)
Age 1.18 0.93 0.88 1.18
(0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19)
Membership 0.93 0.73 0.74 0.92
(0.25) (0.14)* (0.15) (0.25)
Investment 0.85 2.30 1.50 0.87
(0.32) (0.74)*** (0.45) (0.33)
Political 1.12 3.56 3.05 1.08
Engagement (1.10) (4.39) (4.52) (1.05)
Political — 1.90 0.63 —
Ambition (1.94) (0.80)
Cases 154 140 123 121 154 151 154 140
AIC 76.97 82.01 129.94 129.09 109.59 103.62 76.73 81.46
Notes: The table reports odds ratios; themodels for the EU are estimatedwith the Firth correction; inModel Sub-Full andModel Tot-Full,
the odds ratios for political ambition are omitted from the estimation routine because of this variable’s dependence on other variables
in the model. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A7. Results of the logistic regression models without the first set of focal explanatory variables.
Sub-Basic Sub-Full Nat-Basic Nat-Full EU-Basic EU-Full Tot-Basic Tot-Full
Subnational Dissatisfaction 2.65 2.14 1.59 1.75 1.70 1.87 2.51 2.14
(1.02)** (0.89)* (0.41)* (0.51)* (0.46)** (0.57)** (0.97)** (0.89)*
National Dissatisfaction 1.20 1.36 1.59 1.88 0.93 1.13 1.38 1.36
(0.52) (0.69) (0.55) (0.72)* (0.35) (0.45) (0.61) (0.69)
EU Dissatisfaction 1.37 1.25 1.05 1.09 1.38 1.23 1.21 1.25
(0.61) (0.62) (0.36) (0.40) (0.51) (0.45) (0.55) (0.62)
Age 1.09 1.10 0.99 1.09
(0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12)
Membership 1.17 0.85 0.77 1.17
(0.22) (0.13) (0.12) (0.22)
Investment 0.73 1.55 1.49 0.73
(0.22) (0.37)* (0.37) (0.22)
Political Engagement 8.55 4.07 6.77 8.55
(7.17)** (3.73) (10.00) (7.17)**
Political Ambition — 3.57 1.83 —
(2.79) (1.29)
Cases 154 140 129 127 154 151 154 140
AIC 120.97 115.04 179.32 176.82 161.70 149.82 117.97 115.04
Notes: The table reports odds ratios; themodels for the EU are estimatedwith the Firth correction; inModel Sub-Full andModel Tot-Full,
the odds ratios for political ambition are omitted from the estimation routine because of this variable’s dependence on other variables
in the model. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A8. Results of the logistic regression models without the first set of focal explanatory variables and a reduced set of
variables for dissatisfaction.
Sub-Basic Sub-Full Nat-Basic Nat-Full EU-Basic EU-Full Tot-Basic Tot-Full
Subnational Dissatisfaction 2.80 2.39 2.51 2.14
(1.03)*** (0.93)** (0.97)** (0.89)*
National Dissatisfaction 1.97 2.35 1.38 1.36
(0.53)** (0.68)*** (0.61) (0.69)
EU Dissatisfaction 1.46 1.41 1.21 1.25
(0.44) (0.42) (0.55) (0.62)
Age 1.08 1.11 0.99 1.09
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12)
Membership 1.22 0.95 0.86 1.17
(0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)
Investment 0.64 1.37 1.21 0.73
(0.18) (0.29) (0.26) (0.22)
Political Engagement 5.59 5.98 6.37 8.55
(4.18)** (5.23)** (9.30) (7.17)**
Political Ambition 2.20 3.17 1.58 —
(2.49) (2.25) (1.09)
Cases 171 168 140 138 156 153 154 140
AIC 130.14 128.78 190.88 186.80 167.45 156.26 117.97 115.04
Notes: The table reports odds ratios; the models for the EU are estimated with the Firth correction; in Model Tot-Full, the odds ratios
for political ambition are omitted from the estimation routine because of this variable’s dependence on other variables in the model.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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